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INFORMED CONSENT IN HOSPITAL PRACTICE: HEALTH PROFESSIONALS’ PERSPECTIVES & LEGAL
REFLECTIONS
DR ROB HEYWOOD*, PROFESSOR ANN MACASKILL**, DR KEVIN WILLIAMS***
I. Introduction
Informed consent to medical treatment is a vexed topic; medically, legally and ethically.   Consent
is underpinned by the notion  of  personal  autonomy,  and  the  right  to  self-determination.   In  a
medical context this translates into the right of the patient to decide which treatment to agree to  or
refuse.  The ‘informed’ element of  consent  depends  upon  the  provision  of  information  by  the
doctor together with a degree of understanding of that information  from  the  patient.   This  poses
problems for medical professionals as it is difficult to gauge the exact amount of information  they
must give to a patient and the level of understanding which  must  follow  in  order  to  render  any
consent legally and ethically valid.  Arguably, this problem has been exacerbated by the  uncertain
nature of the law in respect of information disclosure.  The English courts have not  found  it  easy
to articulate the scope of a  doctor’s  legal  duty  of  disclosure  nor  have  they  clarified  with  any
certainty how this should  be  judged.[1]   It  is  difficult  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  law’s
imprecision has impacted upon consent procedures in clinical settings  and,  if  it  has,  how.   It  is
against this backdrop that the following study is set.
            This article  presents  the  findings  of  an  empirical  research  project  exploring  informed
consent in secondary care from the perspective of health care professionals in the UK.[2] A  range
of health care professionals actively involved in obtaining informed consent in their practice  were
interviewed to investigate the dynamics of consent and identify how it is obtained. The paper  also
examines  what  is  important  to  health  care  professionals  when  dealing  with  patients.    Eight
consultants,  three  registrars,  three  house  officers/senior  house  officers  and  six   nurses   were
interviewed.  A thematic analysis of all the interview transcripts was conducted  and  the  resultant
themes are discussed.
The study found that health care  professionals  take  consent  seriously  and  view  it  as  a
shared-decision making process.  However, there is a feeling that the process has now become too
bureaucratic.   The  clinicians  acknowledge  the  importance  of  communication  in  consent   and
highlight ways in which patient understanding can be improved.  The findings  identify  a  general
willingness to disclose information to patients and a reluctance to deliberately withhold  anything,
yet there remains a degree of uncertainty about precisely what  should  be  disclosed  and  when  it
may be appropriate to exercise professional  discretion.   The  article  concludes  by  reflecting  on
these findings from a critical legal perspective.
II. BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION
Jones provided the setting for this study. His work began to alert lawyers  of  the  need  to  explore
informed consent beyond the courts and suggested that in order to understand its true meaning one
must look beyond the mere legal doctrine.[3]  Consent procedures in secondary  hospital  care  are
more formal than in primary care but questions remain about  the  dynamics  of  these  procedures,
which are poorly understood, and how they relate to legal theory. The lack  of  empirical  research
in this area provided the justification for the study.
III. METHODS
A. Participants
In total 20  interviews  were  undertaken  with  consultants  (N=8)[4],  registrars  (N=3)[5],  senior
house officers and house officers  (N=3)[6],  and  nurses  of  various  different  grades  comprising
consultant nurse practitioners, ward sisters and staff nurses (N=6).
B. Procedure
Initial contact was made with the consultant who was the  head  of  the  department  in  which  the
majority of the  research  took  place.   Participant  information  sheets  were  disseminated  at  the
weekly management meetings and at this stage a number of clinicians expressed an interest in  the
study.  Before agreeing to take part in the research, the participants were given the  opportunity  to
question the researcher and their informed consent  was  obtained.   The  procedure  for  recruiting
participants may give the impression that the  medical  professionals  involved  were  largely  self-
selecting.  This is true insofar as all the participants were volunteers who,  presumably,  had  some
interest in the subject.  To an extent, this problem is inescapable in much empirical research  since
those who have no interest will simply not take part and coercion on the part of  the  researcher  to
recruit uninterested parties would be  unethical.   With  this  in  mind,  the  potential  for  bias  was
recognised  and  accounted  for  in  the  thematic  analysis  and  the  limitations  of  this  study  are
highlighted at various junctures in this paper.
C. Research Design
The aim of this study was  to  generate  in-depth,  qualitative  data  by  engaging  in  dialogue  and
guided conversation with clinicians  actively  involved  in  the  consent  process.   Semi-structured
interviews were used.  The chief advantage of this model is that it is flexible and open  to  changes
in sequence so that the researcher can follow  up  the  answers  given  and  the  stories  told.[7]   A
number of interview schedules were devised with broad themes.  These  themes  were  formulated
by the research team where it was decided that, in order to allow for legal reflection at  the  end  of
the study, the questions should address what happens in practice, the  views  and  opinions  of  the
various parties concerning what they perceive as being important in  consent,  and  the  difficulties
inherent in the process.  The interviews were conducted up to a point of saturation.[8]
D. Methodological Considerations
Qualitative research of this kind has limitations which need to be considered at  an  early  stage  of
any study.  Due to ethical constraints it was only possible to gain access to  participants  from  one
hospital in the UK and, as the study was  voluntary,  the  research  team  had  no  control  over  the
specialisms of the participants interviewed.  Therefore, it is important to stress that the findings  in
this  qualitative  study  should  not  be  interpreted  in   a   generalised   manner.    Semi-structured
interviews alone are also restrictive in the sense that they only demonstrate  what  participants  say
they do rather than what they actually do.  In order  to  establish  what  really  happens  in  practice
other sources of data are required. As such, observations of practice were used at  a  later  stage  of
the first named author’s PhD in order to triangulate the  study.[9]   To  prevent  the  findings  from
becoming too closely aligned with what the participants describe the  methodology  draws  on  the
philosophical underpinnings  of  both  phenomenology  and  hermeneutics.   Todres  and  Wheeler
explain how this is  possible  by  suggesting  the  two  are  ’natural  bed-fellows’  and  that  neither
boundary is too rigid  nor  permeable  in  terms  of  a  research  methodology.  [10]   In  this  sense
phenomenology focuses on rich description  grounding  the  research  inquiries  and  hermeneutics
adds reflexivity to the research turning to the meaningful questions and concerns that are relevant.
 Thus, the first  section  of  the  study  focuses  on  description  before  proceeding  to  analyse  the
important issues from a critical legal perspective.
E. Ethics
The study was scrutinised by the local NHS Ethics Committee and gained full ethical and research
governance approval.
F. Data Analysis
The interviews were tape recorded, transcribed and uploaded into the software package NVIVO.
The findings were then analysed using computer software to identify recurring themes.[11]
IV. FINDINGS: DESCRIPTIONS OF PRACTICE AND MEDICAL OPINION
The themes are presented in the order in which they were identified.  The  importance  attached  to
each theme is noted in a footnote after the relevant heading.  The level of  importance  of  a  theme
was assessed by the number of times it occurred within the transcripts.
A. Theme 1: The Importance of Consent as a Continuing & Shared-Decision Making Process[12]
Consent seems to be viewed as a  process  in  which  both  the  doctor  and  the  patient  should  be
involved.
Nurse Practitioner No 5: …informed consent I think  it  is  absolutely  vital,  it  is  one  of  the
things that as a nurse practitioner I try to think of as sort of one of  my  babies  really.   I  try  to
make sure that when I am taking consent from a patient that I think about all  the  things  that  I
would want to know myself if that was me sat there. I think it is absolutely vital really  and  not
just to protect us really but more so for the patient…that they are  making  an  informed  choice
about what they are agreeing to be involved in.  Because I know that I  would  want  to  receive
all the relevant information.
The findings suggest that for the participants under investigation, the real importance of consent is
bound up in the needs of the patient. It  is  viewed  as  a  two-way  transaction.[13]   It  seems  that
consent is seen as vital, not for the protection of medical  practitioners,  but  for  the  protection  of
patients.  This point demonstrates one of the limitations of this  paper.   Health  care  professionals
may well view consent as a mutual process, but these findings only portray the views of one  party
within this transaction.  There is existing empirical evidence  that  suggests  patients  do  not  view
consent as reciprocal but instead perceive it as a necessary step to the obtaining of treatment.  [14]
Thus, whilst medical professionals may recognise the desirability of a two-way transaction, it may
not operate this way in practice  if  patients  fail  to  understand  that  the  purpose  of  the  consent
process is to respect their autonomy, to offer them the  opportunity  to  become  involved  in  their
treatment decisions, and to give them the final say about what is done to them.
In order to encourage patient involvement there is a strong feeling that consent should not be  a
single event but an on-going process consisting of a  number  of  consultations  with  all  levels  of
medical practitioners involved in the treatment. This is particularly the case for  cancer  treatments
or where the patient suffered from serious bowel complaints.
Surgical Registrar No 3: Before we see patients we will consent them in clinic.  They  will  be
given opportunities to ask questions, to  go  away  and  think  about  other  questions  that  they
might like to ask, address those questions again later on before the procedure,  before  the  final
completion of their  consent  preferably  not  in  the  room  two  minutes  before  they  have  the
procedure.  It is a symbiotic and active relationship between the patient and the physician.
All the participants in the study expressed  a  view  that  delegation  in  the  consent  process  is
acceptable.  The results indicate that it does take place in practice, both as a mechanism for saving
time and for teaching purposes.
Consultant No 4: I think it is very important to delegate consent if it is appropriate  and  at  the
right time. It is a very important part of training it is an essential part of  training  for  Registers
to consent.  I think the BMA did great harm in the advice that came  out  that  no  junior  doctor
should  be  allowed  to  gain  consent.  It  is  absolute  rubbish  because  it  makes   the   modern
generation of young doctors feel as though “oh we don’t  have  anything  to  do  with  consent.”
But…you need consent every time you touch a patient, you need consent every time  you  write
a prescription form, consent is at the centre of medicine.  Everything that  you  can  think  of  to
mention needs consent and this modern generation need to be aware that if  you  take  on  a  job
you need to take on the consent.
Thus, it seems clear that in some situations those undertaking the medical  procedure  may  not  be
the same person(s) as those taking consent.  Whilst this in  itself  is  not  unusual,  a  strong  caveat
was placed on delegation by all the participants which was that the  person  obtaining  the  consent
must themselves be capable of performing the procedure as this will mean that that they  have  the
necessary understanding of core elements such as risks, benefits and alternatives which need to be
explained to the patient.
B. Theme 2: Problems with the Consent Form[15]
At time this study was conducted, each individual  Trust  had  a  measure  of  discretion  as  to  the
precise design of their consent form.  The consent form discussed in this study was specific to  the
Trust  under  investigation  but  was  based  broadly  on  what  is  now  a   standard   NHS   model.
Typically, consent in secondary care is obtained in writing though the medical practitioners within
the study seem to suggest the process has become too formalised and bureaucratic.  They perceive
the most important basis for consent as being an ethical  imperative  grounded  in  the  wishes  and
needs of the patient, which is about more than obtaining a signature on a form. They suggest there
is a danger that lengthy and elaborate  forms  detract  from  the  consent  process  itself,  a  process
which should discuss the treatment, its risks and benefits.
Harmonising consent procedures may well be bureaucratically appealing insofar as  it  provides
some consistency and certainty at least for doctors, if not patients.  Doctors have  mapped  out  for
them, via the medium of the form, what they ought to be discussing with patients.  Yet, attempting
to impose some level of harmonisation on consent procedures that cover a range of  specialisms  is
very  difficult.   Flexibility  and  professional  judgment  provide  the   key   to   effective   consent
procedures as there is a need to tailor the process to the situation of  the  particular  patient.[16]   It
appears the participants feel that a generalised consent form has the potential to fetter this.
Consultant No 1: Now I object in many ways to the standard consent  form  that  this  hospital
has…the consent form is a generic consent form, which is actually misleading…but  the  Trust,
as advised by the lawyers, have said that we have to use this  ridiculous  form.   In  a  sense  the
consenting is a number of events…but because of the  form  I  think  it  is  nothing  to  do  with
consent.  Now that signing of the consent form might be me saying to patient “sign this consent
form.” The radiographers will be entirely happy if there is a  signature  on  the  form  even  if  I
haven’t gone through the proper process of consenting…
Concerns were raised over problems with bureaucracy and ’red-tape’ in the consent process.   The
feeling was that this is driven  by  ’the  law.’  The  contention  is  grounded  in  the  fact  that  both
doctors and patients involved in the  consent  process  may  be  happy  to  proceed  with  treatment
based on the fact that there is  a  signature  on  a  form.   A  signature  is  certainly  not  conclusive
evidence that any discussion whatsoever has taken place between the doctor and the patient  about
the proposed procedure.
C. Theme 3: Disclosure, Openness and Transparency[17]
The results suggest a commitment  towards  openness  and  disclosure  and  a  willingness  to  talk
through the risks of procedures with patients.
Surgical Registrar  No  3:  It  is  extremely  important.  The  process  of  informed  consent  is
integral to our practice…you need to tell them about the risk of perforation,  the  risk  of  death,
the  risk  of  a  bleed  and  other  associated  problems  as  well,  such  as  a  stroke,  myocardial
infarction, post endoscopic complications such as pain.  The whole range must be explained.
It seems that when risks are not disclosed, this  is  due  to  mere  inadvertence  on  the  part  of  the
medical practitioners or the result of the genuine exercise of what is perceived  to  be  professional
discretion.  Arguably, the latter could be viewed as paternalistic in nature which to  some  may  be
problematic.  Whether or not medical  practitioners  are  aware  of  the  potential  significance  and
dangers associated with this is uncertain.[18]
             There  is  a  general  reluctance  to  withhold  information  and  the   legal   concept   of   a
therapeutic  privilege  was  largely  unrecognised.  The  medical  practitioners  found  difficulty  in
providing examples where they would rely on it or where the information would  be  so  damaging
to justify complete avoidance of disclosure.
Consultant No 3: I don’t like the concept of withholding information because I think  that  that
necessarily is not totally helpful.  There maybe  situations  where  the  patients’  intelligence  or
insight or illness doesn’t allow them to fully understand it and you have to talk to  the  relatives
more about it but I don’t commonly and regularly withhold information.
There appears to be a presumption in favour of disclosure and uncertainty as to the  precise  nature
and applicability of the therapeutic privilege.  Whether this is an accurate reflection of actual  day-
to-day practice remains open to speculation. It is possible that some of the medical practitioners in
the study do withhold some information but do not perceive it  as  being  done  by  reference  to  a
therapeutic privilege; rather they view it as professional discretion in tailoring  information  to  the
needs of individual patients.  The exercise of professional discretion is explored further below.
D. Theme 4: Problems with Risk and Information Disclosure[19]
There is confusion and uncertainty surrounding what risks to  disclose.   The  common  perception
amongst the medical practitioners is that risk disclosure varies depending on the precise  nature  of
the procedure and the severity of the consequences should the risk  materialise.   Risk  calculus  in
medical disclosure entails a delicate balancing act and so disclosure  cannot  be  judged  solely  by
reference to the likelihood of a risk transpiring.  The rate of occurrence has to be  counterbalanced
against the magnitude of harm when deciding what to tell a patient.  By way of example, a  certain
risk may occur frequently in a particular operation, but the potential harm caused by that risk  may
be so trivial that disclosure would not be necessary. By the same token, there may only be a  slight
chance that a certain risk will occur but its consequences may be so  severe  that  the  patient  must
nonetheless be told about it.
Consultant No 2: Yes I mean let us say for example the  consent  for  a  hernia  operation…the
threshold in percentage terms for informed consent is  something  like…2%  OK.   But  then  if
you get a significant complication that is a lot rarer but is well recognised then you have to  tell
them that as well.  Moving away from hernias for the moment…I think the best example  might
be bowel  surgery  where  you  have  got  the  risk  of  patient  nerve  damage  which  might  be
perceived to be less than 1% for example.  I can’t remember off the top of my head…but  there
are certain operations that are well known to cause a very severe problem but only  very  rarely
and you need to spell those out.
Despite clear recognition of the need to perform a balancing act, a significant amount of  attention
is paid to percentages and statistical precision, with emphasis on the figure of between 1  to  2  per
cent occurrence rates as the apparent threshold for risk disclosure.  It is possible that this  figure  is
a result of anecdotal collegial stories about legal action.[20] Irrespective of this,  there  remains  at
least some acknowledgement that in certain situations patients must be told about risks lower than
this figure.  This accurately reflects Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s often cited example in  Sidaway  in
the Court of Appeal that the ‘materiality of any particular  risk  must  depend  on  the  relationship
between the object to be achieved by the operation and the nature of the risk involved.  If  there  is
a half per cent risk of  total  paralysis  that  might  well  be  a  material  risk  in  the  context  of  an
operation designed to get rid of a minor discomfort but not in the context of an operation  required
to avoid death.  The decision as to the materiality of a risk depends  on  the  balancing  of  benefits
and risks.’[21]
In order to meet the legal obligations relating to consent, the nature of the information provided
to  patients  centres  mainly  on  risk  disclosure.   However,  the  participants  also   indicated   the
desirability of disclosing the benefits  of  treatment  in  order  that  patients  can  conceptualise  the
importance of the procedure, helping them to rationalise their predicament and reach an  informed
decision.
Consultant No 7: …Yes I think I tend to do it the other way round.  I  tend  to  say  “you  need
this operation because you have got a cancer that is about to block the  bowel  and  if  we  don’t
remove it then you will be seriously ill…and  there  is  a  good  chance  that  this  will  cure  the
cancer." The downside is…and we are obliged to tell you these risks…”.  So I  tend  to  put  the
positive first and tell them why I think they need it and then I come in with what the risks are.
A number of the participants worried that if only risks are disclosed the patient may not appreciate
the true worth of the treatment and may become confused, frightened and anxious.  Thus,  patients
need to be told about the benefits and consequences of failing to go ahead  with  the  procedure  in
all cases.
Common  practice  appears  to  involve  firstly  explaining  what  is  wrong  with  the  patient,
explaining why the treatment is necessary and then discussing the potential drawbacks in the form
of risks.  It is within the middle component where medical practitioners attempt to frame things  in
a positive light.  The underlying issue is one of balance.    It  is  possible  to  conclude  that  whilst
there is a greater emphasis on risks, disclosure should not be based solely  on  this  and  that  other
types of information are equally important.
There is also a general agreement about the theoretical  desirability  of  disclosing  alternative
treatments to patients despite an underlying concern that this is not  always  practical.   Depending
on the patient’s condition, surgery may  be  the  only  available  option  and  practitioners  may  be
reluctant  to  engage  them  for  fear  of  creating  false  hope.  A  further  concern  centres  on   the
possibility that if the patient is provided with too many options, they  may  become  confused  and
anxious, which may have an adverse effect on the decision-making process.  In situations like this,
the medical practitioners  openly  acknowledge  that  they  would  be  likely  to  guide  the  patient
towards their preferred course of action.
Consultant No 7: …Some of the patients…will go and look up the information for themselves
and may come back with it, but most of the patients actually don’t know the recurrence rates of
the different operations. So we are having to give the information effectively again  by  leading
them into the operation which you think is best for them.  If you give them  the  facts  they  will
pick the same one as you usually.
In certain situations it seems  the  medical  practitioners  decide  what  treatment  to  offer  patients
based on their own preferences for evidence-based practice.  Where alternatives are available,  the
decision to  opt  for  one  course  of  action  over  another  appears  to  be  left  to  the  professional
judgment  of  the  doctors.   The  participants  were  careful  to  stress  the  importance  of   clinical
discretion in consent perhaps recognising that patients, like people, differ and may benefit  from  a
tailored approach to disclosure, an attitude which  is  embraced  by  the  GMC  in  its  most  recent
guidance on consent.[22]
Nurse Practitioner No 5: …I mean this is the thing about consent  particularly  in  relation  to,
say, endoscopy when you are giving sedation.  You  have  to  make  a  very  balanced  decision
about what you need to tell that patient as an individual because you might get  somebody  very
fit and well, where the risk of giving sedation is actually very minimal whereas  you  might  get
somebody who is much more  elderly  where  the  risk  of  giving  sedation  is  obviously  much
higher. So I do try and give it on an individual basis and think about them as an individual.
This exercise of clinical judgement is a necessary part of the consent process  allowing  disclosure
to be defined by reference to the individual.[23]
E. Theme 5: Underlying Paternalism & Best-Interests[24]
Paternalistic healthcare practice is premised on the idea that treatment  decisions  should  be  made
for patients by experts.  The view of a doctor or nurse as a professional  with  superior  knowledge
to that of the novice patient is often relied upon as justification  for  this  approach.   In  a  medical
context, the concept of best-interests may be viewed by some as a natural corollary of  paternalism
as one would hope that any treatment decision made for a patient is in fact  made  with  their  best-
interests in mind.  Nonetheless, this will not always be the case because  the  undesirable  situation
may arise in which a  medical  professional  may  act  paternalistically  to  make  a  decision  for  a
patient  which  cannot  ever  be  viewed  as  being  in  their   best-interests.    Equally,   a   medical
practitioner can act in a patient’s best-interests without ever having to make the decision for them.
 This attitude was apparent from the medical professionals in this study signifying that whilst best-
interests and paternalism are two concepts which  can  sometimes  be  closely  aligned,  there  is  a
difference.
Nurse Practitioner No 5: When I  am  taking  consent  what  is  foremost  in  my  mind  is  the
patient, that I want them to be able to  decide  that  what  I  am  offering  them  and  what  I  am
proposing to do to them is in their best interests.
The opinion from the participants is that  paternalism  is  no  longer  acceptable.   However,  some
suggest they would always act in the patient’s best interests  and  that  this  is  acceptable,  perhaps
reinforcing their view that paternalism and best-interests are inherently  different  concepts.   Even
though a transparent and open relationship is looked upon  favourably,  there  is  evidence  that  in
some  circumstances  some  clinicians  may  be  economical  with  the  truth  depending   on   their
perception of needs of the individual before them.
Consultant No 4:  I think I do it all the time.  I don’t every time I consent a hernia go down the
complete list of risks that every single patient might get. And there are  people,  as  I  say,  who
don’t want to know but at some level…I will make a decision.  So every time you consent  you
make a decision…it is my judgement where I draw the line.
This conduct is not perceived by the participants as paternalistic in nature,  even  though  in  some
circumstances it could be; rather this is seen  perhaps  as  an  acceptable  exercise  of  professional
judgement.
F. Theme 6: Communication Breakdown and Patient Understanding[25]
Every participant acknowledged that good communication skills from  both  medical  practitioners
and patients are the key to effective consent procedures.  There is however concern  over  the  fact
that the communication process may break down within medical  consultations.   There  appear  to
be two perceived reasons for this.
            First, broadly there are two types of patients; those who actively seek out  information  and
who are willing to become involved in their healthcare, and those who  do  not  want  to  know  as
much preferring to proceed in blissful ignorance.
Consultant No 4: Yes I mean a lot of what I personally do is based  on  a  basic  psychological
appraisal.  Patients in information gathering fall into 2 groups.  There  are  around  30%  of  the
patient population who don’t want to know  anything  and  they  are  difficult  because  all  they
want to do is sign the consent form. They don’t want any risks  given  they  would  rather  walk
away from it and you have to make a decision as to what length you will  push  them  to  listen.
Most  normal  people  are  absolutely  fine  with  it  and  they  will  keep  on  requesting  further
information. I would then go beyond  my  normal  level  in  order  to  make  sure  that  they  are
informed of every single risk.  So you are making  a  basic  and  fairly  primitive  psychological
assessment as to whether you should force the information on a patient or  whether  you  would
be overloading the patient with too much information.
The  willingness  of  a  patient  to  communicate  is  perceived  to  be  linked  to   their   individual
personality.  The perception is that  the  disparity  in  power  also  has  a  bearing  on  the  patient’s
willingness to communicate and engage with the doctor about their treatment.
House Officer: …we come round in big groups of people and stand at the end of  the  bed  and
don’t let them know what is going on. Or because they come to a clinic and they are  scared  of
what is going on…that they might have to have some horrible operation.  Yes  definitely…they
are sat in a bed with no clothes on and we are all standing at the end of  the  bed  writing  down
notes.
The  medical  practitioners  are  conscious  that  patients  may  sometimes   feel   intimidated   and
vulnerable in the face of medical expertise.  This may lead to a reluctance to ask questions for fear
of embarrassment caused by poor understanding, anxiety  over  difficulties  articulating  questions
appropriately, or a reluctance to engage deriving from  the  notion  that  the  ’doctor  knows  best.’
The other explanation is that some patients may simply be reluctant to ask for fear  of  hearing  the
worst.[26]
            The legal emphasis is undoubtedly on  disclosure,  yet  the  information  imparted  may  be
largely meaningless unless the patient has the capacity to  understand  what  is  being  said.   Thus,
understanding was highlighted as being an important factor  in  informed  consent,  though  it  was
also thought of as problematic because understanding  is  subjective.   The  difficulty  for  medical
practitioners is how patients interpret information.  The perception is that, in some  circumstances,
patients will be unable to comprehend what is being said  and  will  become  confused,  frightened
and anxious.  Without understanding their  condition  and  why  treatment  is  needed,  the  patient
cannot conceptualise and  weigh  the  information  in  the  balance  rendering  any  disclosure  and
subsequent consent procedure largely empty.   Thus,  a  number  of  the  health  care  professionals
focus on how to enhance understanding.  In the face of severe  illness  and  bad  news,  the  patient
may have great difficulty retaining and comprehending information regardless  of  what  steps  the
doctor takes  to  help.   Some  patients  may  pretend  to  understand  when  actually  they  do  not.
Ensuring complete understanding is not only  unrealistic  but  also  unnecessary,  so  the  emphasis
must therefore switch to ensuring that the patient can balance the benefits against the risks.
Consultant No 8: I will try and put it in terms that a patient can understand. I will say “there is
1:100 chance of death from this procedure” and they will say “that is not a very big risk  is  it?”
I will say “well I wonder…if you were travelling on an aeroplane to America, and  on  the  side
of the aeroplane it said ‘we fall out of the sky 1:100 times’ would you get  on  that  aeroplane?”
The answer is no, of course they wouldn’t. But if they were in some  war  torn  state  in  Africa,
and they were about to be shot and there was one plane leaving that had the  same  message  on
it, would you get on the plane? Of course you would.
The study lends support to the suggestion that clinicians think an effective way to facilitate patient
understanding of risk is to use analogies, something patients can  relate  to.[27]   Attention  is  also
paid to how things are said as this influences how information comes across to patients and how it
is interpreted.  In  addition,  a  number  of  the  clinicians  indicate  the  desirability  of  using  both
literature and illustrations to enhance patient understanding.  Drawing  things  for  patients  allows
them to visualise what is wrong and how it is going to be corrected; written information  is  useful
for explaining things to patients in a simple manner  allowing  them  time  to  formulate  questions
away from the consultation.
            Some patients leave consultations having been advised to  read  up  about  their  condition,
and later return with extensive literature on  the  subject,  which  may  be  irrelevant,  excessive  or
inaccurate, particularly where it has been obtained off the Internet.
Consultant No 8: ...when the internet first got going they would come with reams of paper and
ask me to comment on this that and the other. And I said “I am not going to  comment  on  this,
you have come for my opinion that is someone else’s opinion and  therefore  you  have  to  take
that and weigh it in the balance.”  The problem is  that  most  of  the  information  that  you  get
from the Internet will come from 2 different types of sites... the good sites where they are  from
University based hospitals in the States giving good information, and  the  bad  sites  which  are
private clinics that are actually touting for business.
Medical practitioners acknowledge that if guided to the correct sites, the Internet can  be  a  useful
resource.  However, there is a lot of information contained on the web that is both  inaccurate  and
potentially misleading.  When patients access this a great deal  of  time  has  to  be  spent  allaying
unnecessary patient concerns. Further problems are  created  by  information  from  abroad  where
medical techniques may differ from those offered in this country.  Some overseas techniques  may
not be evidenced-based practices and the practitioner here is left having to  justify  why  they  will
not perform a particular new and innovative procedure that may be on offer elsewhere.
G. Theme 7: The Law Encouraging Defensive Medicine[28]
Defensive medicine is more usually discussed in relation to  diagnosis  and  treatment.  It  may  be
perceived by some, including  the  participants,  that  defensive  medicine  is  not  associated  with
consent.  However, there is indirect evidence relating  to  what  might  be  classified  as  defensive
medicine and thus some tentative conclusions may be drawn from this study.
There is some evidence of ’excessive’ risk disclosure  where  medical  practitioners  think  they
have to tell patients about risks they otherwise would not have disclosed.
Consultant No 8: No in fact there are times when the patient says “I don’t want to know  that.”
And I say, “I am sorry I am going to tell you.”
This attitude may be attributable to the law and could  be  detrimental  to  both  the  doctor  patient
relationship and the consent process as a whole.[29]  This has to be  approached  with  caution.   It
appears that despite some feeling that the law forces their hand to disclose, the doctors also feel  it
is important to exercise clinical judgement and discretion in tailoring information to suit the needs
of individual patients. This is almost a contradiction. Perhaps the most  plausible  interpretation  is
that they try to maintain clinical discretion but feel the law is eroding this.
A further issue centres on the  patient  entitlement  to  waive  their  right  to  informed  consent.
Even in situations where the patient explicitly states they do not  want  to  hear  information  about
risks, and voluntarily place themselves in the hands of the doctor, there is  evidence  that  some  of
the participants insist, regardless of the patient’s request not to be  informed.   This  appears  to  be
commonly associated with the law and the fear of legal action should anything untoward happen.
Nurse Practitioner No 5:…I think that there is argument that we feel  obliged  to  tell  patients
everything because you are worried that if you don’t say it, and then god forbid  the  1:1000000
risk happens, that they are going to say to you “well you never said that.” So I suppose there  is
a bit of defensive medicine going on there.
It is very difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the influence of the law  and  whether  or
not it encourages defensive medicine.  One of the main reasons for this resides in the fact that it  is
very  hard  to  identify  precisely  what   is   meant   by   defensive   medicine.[30]    One   possible
explanation focuses  on  unnecessary  tests  and  procedures  that  squander  time  and  money.[31]
Equally, one may equate defensive medicine with over cautious practice which  demonstrates  that
it perhaps should not always be viewed as  a  bad  thing.  These  definitions,  however,  do  not  fit
neatly with consent practices and information disclosure in clinical settings.  For  the  purposes  of
this study, defensive medicine is defined as exposing the patient  to  excessive  information  about
risks  and  alternatives  which  may   be   unnecessary   in   the   circumstances,   and   refusing   to
acknowledge the patient is entitled to waive their right to certain information, practices  which  are
justified on the grounds of the need to avoid legal liability.
If, as is suggested above, defensive medicine  is  taken  to  mean  the  changing  of  clinical
practices in order to guard against legal action,  this  is  not  necessarily  a  bad  thing,  particularly
given  that  one  of  the  goals  of  tort  law  is  to  influence  how  doctors  and  other   health   care
professionals act and to encourage  higher  standards  of  care.[32]   Thoroughness  in  information
disclosure is desirable; it is only when disclosure becomes excessive that it may be detrimental  to
patients by triggering unnecessary alarm.  What amounts to ’excessive disclosure’  will  inevitably
vary  depending  on  the  individual  patient  in  question  but  it  is  certainly  possible  that   some
disclosure practices are unwarranted and have an adverse affect.  Arguably, any  disclosure  which
facilitates understanding and decision-making should be viewed positively, but there may come  a
point when  too  much  information  may  obstruct  this  by  causing  confusion,  fear  and  anxiety
amongst patients.
Though there is  evidence  that  clinical  negligence  claims  generally  are  decreasing,[33]
research tells us that malpractice lawsuits  probably  do  impact  upon  the  way  in  which  doctors
practice  medicine,  and  that  some  of  what  they  do  may  not  help   patients.[34]    A   possible
explanation is that doctors have anxieties about medical malpractice lawsuits that go well  beyond
the real risks they face.[35]  Thus, rather than the legal  rules  having  any  direct  effect,  it  is  the
perceived threat of liability which causes concern.
H. Theme 8: Reliance on Professional Guidelines[36]
Whilst some of the medical practitioners are aware of the documentation from the  Department  of
Health and General Medical Council about consent, the majority admit to having little  knowledge
of these protocols.  This is hardly surprising given empirical evidence that doctors are unaware  of
other guidelines, such as the GMC’s code mandating emergency treatment.[37]  Even  where  they
are aware of the guidelines, the clinicians admit that often the attention paid to them in practice  is
minimal for two reasons.  First, medical practitioners have only  limited  time  to  read  and  digest
such recommendations.  Second, they are seen as over-complex and an impractical model  of  how
consent should be obtained, eroding any scope for clinical discretion.
Consultant No 3: You have to pay attention to them but the trouble is sometimes they  are  not
totally practical...the danger is that people are overwhelmed  with  paper  and  don’t  read  them
anyway.  They do it to cover themselves so that if anything goes wrong it is  the  doctors’  fault
that they didn’t follow the guidelines so to speak.  That doesn’t help at the end of the day  what
it comes back to is does the patient understand what is being done to them.
Whilst detailed and elaborate  guidelines  may  serve  as  a  marker  for  good  practice,  enhancing
consent in clinical settings, they may become little more than an unworkable ideal largely  ignored
by those who should be relying on them most.
V.  LEGAL AND CRITICAL REFLECTION
A.  The Consent Form
Jones  has  suggested  that  ’for  those  who  consider   that   consent   is   merely   a   medico-legal
requirement which must be endured in order to protect the doctor, there is a danger  that  they  will
engage in a formulaic process which does little to inform the patient, and, ironically,  just  as  little
to protect the doctor.’[38]  The medical practitioners in this study do not perceive consent as being
just a ’medico-legal  requirement.’[39]   They  demonstrate  a  commitment  towards  keeping  the
patient informed and look positively on the concept of shared-decision making.[40]  However, the
language used by the participants reflects  a  view  that  the  detailed  nature  of  the  consent  form
stifles some of the professional discretion that is needed in order  to  render  consent  a  process  in
which the patient is truly involved.  [41]   The  medical  practitioners  perceive  the  over-complex
nature of the standard NHS form as being driven by the law and  believe  this  has  turned  consent
into a regimented and  bureaucratic  procedure.   This  creates  the  risk,  identified  by  Jones,  that
medical practitioners are left ’"consenting  the  patient",  a  term  which  suggests  that  consent  is
something that is done to the patient, usually for  the  purposes  of  avoiding  legal  liability,  not  a
process that the patient participates, much less  controls.’[42]
B. Problems with Risk Disclosure
Berry has suggested:
’Difficulties in assessment, perception and management of risk  all  have  implications  for  risk
communication. If we do not have accurate information about the "real" level of  risks  in  most
situations, if people perceive risk differently and vary in what they believe to be an  appropriate
balance between risk and reward…then determining what information to present  to  them,  and
in what form, is far from straightforward.’[43]
As negligence is now the dominant basis for legal actions based on inadequate  disclosure,  and  as
this tort is predicated on harm, the requirement to  provide  necessary  information  preceding  any
operation has inevitably focused  on  the  risks  inherent  in  treatment.[44]   As  a  result,  medical
practitioners’ perceptions of consent have been tainted and, despite  the  fact  that  consent  should
not be solely about risks, the development of the law has undoubtedly encouraged  prominence  to
be attached to this aspect of it.  This  is  problematic  not  least  because  the  concept  of  informed
consent arguably has less to do with the liability of professionals as agents of disclosure and  more
to do with the autonomous choices of patients and subjects.’[45]
            In the past, the English courts have not welcomed the American legal doctrine of informed
consent.[46]  Thus, the problem for the law has been reaching a  consensus  on  how  to  judge  the
adequacy of clinicians’  disclosure,  a  matter  on  which  arguably  it  has  yet  to  reach  any  firm
conclusions.[47]  The findings here reflect the view that  doctors  are  also  unsure  about  what  to
disclose  in  practice,  although  whether  or  not  this  confusion  is  caused  by  the   law   remains
uncertain.  For clinicians to be influenced by the law’s uncertainty it would have to be proved  that
they know something about it and the indications are that the  medical  practitioners  in  the  study
only had a vague understanding of what the law says.[48]  Thus, it is possible that their  confusion
about what to disclose comes from elsewhere,  perhaps  stemming  from  uncorroborated  collegial
anecdotes about disclosure.
The results of this study seem to indicate two things.  First,  the  medical  practitioners  say
risks are disclosed by reference to the probability of them materialising, and, second, that attention
is given to the patient as an individual and the seriousness of the procedure’s associated risks.   As
well as considering what ought to be disclosed to the patient, there must also be  scope  for  taking
into account what should not be disclosed in relation to their particular circumstances.   How  does
this reflect on the various legal standards of care?
Even though the English courts have never explicitly endorsed the prudent patient standard
of disclosure as formulated in Canterbury, it is safe to  say  that  disclosure  is  no  longer  dictated
solely by the Bolam standard.[49]
It seems that medical practitioners are now under an obligation to disclose all risks that the
court would deem significant based on its  objective  assessment  of  what  the  reasonable  patient
would want to know.[50]  In reaching its conclusions, it is crucial for the court  to  remember  that
what constitutes a significant risk cannot be defined solely by reference to  the  percentage  chance
of it transpiring, the nature of the risk must also be considered  and  this  factor  is  arguably  more
important than its incidence.  If percentages are relied on too heavily  to  dictate  disclosure  trends
this has the potential to overlook the fact that the significance  of  risk  will  vary  from  patient  to
patient, based not only on the seriousness of their condition and the overall  state  of  their  general
health, but also the wider social factors that affect the lifestyle of the patient.[51]    Risks  must  be
considered  in  context  for,  as  Kennedy  suggests,   the   recourse   to   probabilities   creates   the
unfortunate impression that the law can produce a standard of care which substitutes  mathematics
and probability theory for the uncertain terms which provide the framework within which the  law
of negligence operates.  He further highlights the problem  that  there  may  well  be  disagreement
amongst medical practitioners as to the precise number to be assigned to the chance of a particular
risk  materialising.[52]   The  courts  have  recognised  these   dangers   but   have   often   become
embroiled  in  referring  to  percentages  by  way  of  example.[53]   Understandably,  the  medical
profession have clung to this as a method of providing a benchmark against which  disclosure  can
be measured, but a major difficulty for patients is how to interpret these statistics.[54]
In order to combat interpretational  problems,  Gutteling  and  Wiegman  propose  that  the
principal ’ground rule’ of risk communication is that the information should be customised  to  the
receiver’s needs.[55]  Whilst the medical practitioners  in  this  study  do  acknowledge  that  some
consideration  is  given  to  the  needs  of  the  individual,  with   so   much   emphasis   placed   on
percentages, the subjective element of understanding risk disclosure has  the  potential  to  become
lost.  Indeed, Gutteling and Wiegman suggest that effective risk communication ought  to  address
the  questions  that  are  relevant  to   the   receiver,   be   comprehensible,   and   not   add   further
confusion.[56]
A further difficulty for the law is whose point of view counts  when  the  significance  of  a
risk is judged.  Based on Lord Woolf MR’s judgment in Pearce, it seems to be a  question  for  the
courts.[57]   This  study  supports  Maclean’s  recent  assertion  that  ’the  question  of  a  risk  is  a
subjective issue coloured by the  individual’s  character,  experiences  and  goals’  and  that  a  real
danger is created where the law applies an objective test to what is essentially a subjective  matter.
[58]  He further argues  that  if  the  test  were  subjective  it  would  be  more  sensitive  to  patient
autonomy.[59] However, this potential approach  has  been  criticised[60]  prompting  Maclean  to
call for some empirical research to ’give a voice to the reasonable patient.’[61]  Thus, building  on
Kennedy’s assertion that ’the law must be perforce  uncertain,  and  not  seek  to  incorporate  tests
which…could  be  invoked  against  the  interests  of  patients’[62],  this  study  demonstrates   the
importance  of  a  test  for  disclosure  based  on  what  the  hypothetical  patient   would   consider
significant in the actual patient’s situation.[63]
C. Excessive Risk Disclosure: Perceptions of the Law
Some years ago Kennedy stated:
’In the context of  disclosure  of  information,  the  very  notion  of  a  professional  standard  is
something of a nonsense.  There is simply no such standard, if only because the profession  has
not got  together  to  establish  which  risks  should  be  disclosed  to  which  patients  in  which
circumstances.’[64]
This statement may have some truth to it.  However, the fact  that  historically  the  profession  did
not get together to establish a standard for disclosure does not in itself mean that one did not exist.
 For example, there is a recognised standard for competent surgery but the medical profession  has
never got together to fix such a standard.  Whilst it appears that medical practitioners are confused
over exactly what to disclose, the findings suggest that the clinicians in this study operate within a
framework of disclosure that is dictated by  a  benchmark  figure  of  one  per  cent.   Thus,  in  the
hospital where this research took place, there appeared to be  at  least  a  degree  of  harmonisation
over disclosure.
The courts have never stipulated that all risks around  the  one  per  cent  mark  have  to  be
disclosed and whilst in some circumstances this may represent good practice[65], in others it  may
not.[66] Disclosure is very much a subjective issue and consideration has to be given  to  the  level
of information the particular patient wants. Miller has suggested that patients differ in the  amount
and type of information they wish to receive.  He categorised patients into two  broad  groups:  the
so-called ’blunters’, who use defensive mechanisms of avoidance and denial to deal  with  threats;
and ’monitors’, who  seek  out  information  about  the  threat.  These  two  groups  need  different
approaches to information giving.[67]  This is confirmed by a number of the  clinicians  who  said
that not all patients want to be informed about all risks, and that regimented disclosure of all  risks
around  the  one  per  cent  mark  in  every  situation  removes  an  important  element  of   clinical
discretion.[68]
The  law  supports  professional  discretion  in  terms  of  either   the   Bolam   test   or   the
therapeutic privilege.[69]  The findings seem to suggest that whilst medical  practitioners  want  to
maintain a degree of professional discretion in respect of disclosure, they are unaware that the law
allows them to do so.
If the underlying purpose of the law is to  respect  and  protect  patient  autonomy,  it  must
recognise the patient’s right of waiver. [70]  There  is  a  distinct  lack  of  legal  authority  on  this
matter which led Kennedy and Grubb to suggest that the law will  recognise  the  waiver  probably
sometimes but not always.[71]  It seems clear that in the appropriate circumstances the law should
allow a competent patient to  waive  their  right  to  pre-operative  information  and  to  proceed  in
ignorance.  Once it is established that the doctor’s initial intention was to  disclose,  then  provided
the  patient  expresses  a  clear  wish  to  invoke  the  waiver  and  does  so  both  competently  and
voluntarily, it seems highly unlikely that the courts will impose liability  on  medical  practitioners
for non-disclosure.  Thus, in a legal sense, the key question becomes: what are  the  restrictions,  if
any, on the waiver?
Kennedy and Grubb suggest that the patient may waive the right to information as to risks,
but not to information about the nature and  purpose  of  the  proposed  procedure  as  it  would  be
against public policy to allow them to do so.[72]  There is clear merit in this claim,  although  pure
autonomists may take issue with  such  an  assertion.   There  is  also  a  pragmatic  and  evidential
difficulty in establishing whether or not a valid waiver exists.  Any patient that has instigated legal
action will presumably deny it and, in the absence of any documentary  evidence,  the  courts  may
be slow to accept that the patient effectively informed  the  doctor  that  they  did  not  want  to  be
informed.  The reality of the matter is that it may turn on an assessment of whose  evidence  is  the
most credible on the day, a question which will always remain  uncertain.   In  order  to  safeguard
against this, documentary evidence of the waiver is essential and this one potential  benefit  of  the
consent form, which should include a provision  which  allows  the  patient  to  acknowledge  they
have relinquished their right to pre-operative information.
If the law is slow to recognise  the  valid  use  of  clinical  judgment  in  disclosure,  or  the
patient’s right of waiver, it  risks  endorsing  a  culture  of  ’excessive  risk  disclosure’,  or,  on  an
alternative interpretation,  defensive  medical  practice.   Nonetheless,  it  seems  clear  that  in  the
correct circumstances the law will allow the use of discretion in disclosure and recognise the  right
of waiver.  The problem is that this may  be  misunderstood  by  the  medical  professionals.   This
attitude seems attributable to a perceived fear of the law by clinicians.  As Baker suggests ’the gap
between the myth and reality does not mean we should cut back on liability. Instead, it means  that
we  need  to  convince  doctors  to  take  the  same   evidence-based   approach   to   understanding
malpractice law suits that we would like them to take to medical practice.’[73]
D. Disclosure Beyond Risks
Looking beyond the mere disclosure of risks to discussing the benefits  of  treatment  ought  to  be
viewed as good practice.[74]  A counter argument is that if doctors frame things in a positive way,
patients will remember more  about  the  benefits  and  this  has  the  potential  to  overshadow  the
seriousness of the risks.[75]  It may be that patients will often  look  to  the  positives.   A  balance
needs to be struck in order to afford the patient the opportunity to place into context  the  need  for
the proposed treatment so they can make a more reasoned decision.
            In respect of disclosing alternative procedures, there is a lack of English  authority  on  this
issue.[76]  Kennedy and Grubb say that in Sidaway none of their Lordships referred to any duty to
advise patients of alternatives.[77]  With respect, this is inaccurate.  Lord Scarman stated  that  his
interpretation  of  the  duty  to  disclose  should   encompass   alternatives   to   the   recommended
treatment.[78]  In order that the duty to disclose fulfils its intended purpose,  there  must  be  some
consideration afforded to the requirement to disclose alternatives. It appears from our findings that
there is some disagreement over this, though some clinicians intimate it is  appropriate  to  discuss
treatment options with patients.  Yet, in the same breath, examples were provided where decisions
seem to be implicitly made for patients, justified on the grounds of evidence-based practice or  the
personal preference of clinicians.  From a legal perspective this is dubious practice which  may  be
open to future challenge.  Despite the fact that in  the  past  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  this
component  of  the  duty,  there  is  evidence  that  this  is  changing.   Pearce,  for   example,   was
concerned with the choice between  no  intervention,  induction  and  caesarean  section.[79]   The
risks  associated  with  the  latter  two  options  were  disclosed,  but   the   risks   inherent   in   the
consultant’s preferred choice, the natural delivery, were not.   Even  though  the  claim  eventually
failed, it was recognised that the omission to disclose the relevant risks of one particular treatment
option denied the patient the opportunity to make an informed choice thereby providing  the  basis
for legal action.   More  recently,  in  Birch  v  University  College  Hospitals  NHS  Trust,[80]  the
defendant hospital was held liable for failing  to  discuss  with  the  patient  the  different  imaging
methods of the MRI scan and the angiogram and  the  comparative  risks  and  benefits  associated
with each.  It was found as fact that had the different treatment  options  been  discussed  with  the
patient she would have opted for the MRI scan and thus avoided the injury which  was  caused  by
immediate recourse to the angiogram.[81]
     Thus, increasingly,  it  seems  that  if  clinicians  fail  to  discuss  and  offer  different  treatment
options to patients, and injury transpires, they run the  risk  of  being  held  liable  for  withholding
information about possible  alternatives.  This  is  particularly  the  case  where,  for  example,  the
procedure opted for by the consultant carries with it a greater degree of risk, both in the chances of
it materialising and its severity, as opposed to an alternative procedure carrying  considerably  less
risk.  Denying patients a choice by reference to ‘evidence-based practice’ may be viewed by some
as little more than medical paternalism in the  sense  that  clinicians  are  not  painting  a  complete
picture for patients and are actually preventing them from having the final say  on  their  treatment
in  command  of  the  full  facts.   Choosing  procedures  on  the  grounds  of  personal  preference,
convenience and allocation of resources may, in the future, be frowned upon by the  courts  and  is
likely to play second fiddle to considerations of patient autonomy. [82]
E. Enhancing Understanding & Communication
In contemporary medical care we may see more attention paid to  the  ’understanding’  component
of consent, and the focus of the patients’ legal arguments  may  switch  towards  the  opportunities
they were given to understand the information provided, particularly if risk disclosure  becomes  a
regimented process in which the patient is bombarded with information.  However,  to  date,  little
attention has been paid by the courts to the duty to  facilitate  understanding.   Smith  v  Tunbridge
Wells HA[83] is one of only a few cases to consider the question  of  understanding.[84]   Morland
J. suggested:
’When recommending a particular type of surgery or treatment,  the  doctor,  when  warning  of
the risks, must take reasonable care to ensure that his explanation of the risks is  intelligible  to
his particular patient.  The doctor should use language, simple but  not  misleading,  which  the
doctor perceives from what knowledge and acquaintanceship that he  may  have  of  the  patient
(which might be slight), will be understood  by  the  patient  so  that  the  patient  can  make  an
informed  decision  as  to   whether   or   not   to   consent   to   the   recommended   surgery   or
treatment.’[85] [author emphasis added].
Grubb warns that this should not be interpreted so as to impose too heavy a burden on  the  doctor;
the doctor’s duty  remains  one  of  reasonableness  in  English  law.[86]   The  correct  reading  of
Morland J.’s judgment must therefore be that there is a  requirement  only  for  the  doctor  to  take
reasonable steps to make the information intelligible and understandable.[87] The  trouble  is  that
the  courts  have  yet  to  articulate  what  those  reasonable  steps  might  be.[88]   An   interesting
comparison may be drawn here between the standard of disclosure in negligence and the informed
consent provisions  contained  in  the  clinical  trial  regulations.   In  the  latter,  the  participant  is
entitled  to  an  interview  during  which  he  or  she  is  given  the  opportunity  to  understand  the
objectives,  risks  and  inconveniences  of  the  trial.[89]   This,  of  course,  provides  a   frame   of
reference for identifying which steps must be taken to enhance understanding, and would no doubt
be a useful starting point in any examination of reasonableness  on  the  part  of  the  doctor.   This
study also provides some examples of good practice that can be  used  to  facilitate  understanding.
The courts could develop these into guidelines to assist them in determining whether a doctor  has
done enough to enhance this aspect of consent.  Good  communication  leads  to  higher  levels  of
understanding. Patients prefer  it  when  doctors  are  good  communicators  and  this  undoubtedly
improves what they understand.  The use  of  information  sheets,  diagrams  and  visual  aids  also
enhances comprehension, as  does  the  use  of  analogies  to  allow  patients  to  contextualise  the
severity and the need for treatment.
These,  coupled  with  the  dissemination  of  written  information,  provide  valuable  methods   of
improving patient knowledge.[90]
Educating  the  patient  to  a  level  where  they  achieve   complete   understanding   is   an
unrealistic goal and would place an unworkable duty on clinicians. However, this is not to say that
the law cannot assess the reasonable steps that should be taken to assist the  patient  to  understand
the implications of the proposed treatment. This would encourage clinicians to create a  culture  in
which patients better comprehend treatment and so express a more sufficiently informed consent.
F. Consent as a Continuing Process
One of the main problems with consent is that the law does not view it is a  continuing  process  to
the extent that is perhaps should.  Therefore there is a difference  between  the  way  in  which  the
law approaches its analysis of consent and the way in which the medical practitioners here say it is
actually carried out in practice.  The focus of the  legal  inquiry  in  the  cases  has  centred  on  the
reasonableness  or  otherwise  of  the  exchange  between  the  medical  practitioner  obtaining  the
signature (usually  but  not  always  the  consultant)  and  the  patient.   The  law  has  never  really
engaged in a wider examination of whether or  not  the  patient  was  kept  informed  at  numerous
stages  of  the  treatment  process  by  different  levels  of  healthcare   professionals.    The   law’s
assessment of  consent  concentrates  on  the  isolated  incident  of  when  it  was  obtained  and  if
disclosure was reasonable at that point.  This overlooks  whether  or  not  patients  were  given  the
maximum opportunity to make a considered choice leading Williams to suggest that in negligence
’self-determination is seen in functional terms - as a part of the doctor’s duty of care -  rather  than
in terms of the patient’s right to make a considered  choice,  the  legal  inquiry  tends  to  focus  on
what, if anything, the doctor said…and whether any disclosure was adequate.’[91]
If consent is obtained merely on the  morning  of  the  operation,  it  may  be  perceived  by
patients  and  doctors  as  something  that  is  just   a   bureaucratic   necessity   and   the   rationale
underpinning the process itself may  be  ignored.   In  contrast,  the  opportunity  to  exercise  self-
determination is advanced if consent is viewed in a progressive manner which begins the  moment
the patient is referred to hospital.  Even if signing the form is not performed until a later  date,  the
regular communication of information  should  form  part  of  an  on-going  process.  It  seems  the
clinicians in this study realise that what they do prior to  the  formalities  associated  with  consent
forms an integral part of consent, the purpose of  which  is  to  keep  the  patient  as  ’informed’  as
possible.  From a legal point of  view,  if  it  can  be  proved  that  the  patient  was  provided  with
information about risks, benefits and alternatives on many different  occasions  and  was  afforded
opportunities to ask questions with different clinicians, this may go some way towards inclining  a
court to reach the conclusion that the patient was indeed kept ’reasonably’ informed.
            Legally speaking, delegating consent appears to make little difference as the focus remains
on what is actually said, rather  than  who  says  it.[92]  On  the  other  hand,  if  medical  staff  are
unaware of what the procedure entails then clearly they should not  take  the  patient’s  consent.  It
has been demonstrated in this study that specialist nurses play an active role in the consent process
and a number of consultants highlight  the  important  role  that  delegation  has  in  educating  and
training junior doctors about the importance  of  consent.  [93]    Thus,  as  long  as  there  remains
adequate supervision, involving a variety of medical practitioners may be beneficial.
G. Professional Guidelines: Setting a New Standard
Jones  comments  that  ’as  professional  attitudes   to   the   question   of   information   disclosure
change…patients will become entitled to more information  under  the  Bolam  standard.’[94]  The
standards of the profession are changing demonstrating a commitment towards keeping the patient
better informed than was once the case.[95]
Nevertheless, whether or not professional guidelines can be used to define a new legal standard  of
care  in  respect  of  information  disclosure  is  uncertain.[96]  First,  the  standard   set   by   these
guidelines is in advance of what the law requires and, second, the courts are under no obligation to
follow these standards.  Undoubtedly they will provide some guidance and  the  courts  may  often
be inclined to rely on them. However, whether the protocols are transferable in the sense that  they
can be determinative of what constitutes a legally valid consent is questionable.  For them to  have
any practical effect, clinicians have to be aware of them. It  appears  from  the  findings  that  even
though many are aware of their existence, they are unaware of  their  substantive  content.   Whilst
legally  speaking  ignorance  is  no  excuse,  for  the  guidelines  to  have  any  practical  worth  the
standards set must be put into practice.[97]  The participants  in  this  study  believe  that  some  of
them  are  unduly  idealistic  and  fail  to  account  for  the  realities  of  the   consent   process.    If
compliance with the guidelines is unachievable  in  practice,  and  cannot  realistically  be  met  by
clinicians, there is an inescapable difficulty in allowing them to mould the legal standard  of  care.
However, even if professional guidelines have little direct  effect  on  practice  they  may  have  an
indirect influence in the form of a slow trickle down  effect.   In  this  sense  even  though  doctors
may not be immediately aware of the guidelines, over time their content will permeate the mind of
doctors through case reporting and the medical press which will inevitably have some  bearing  on
future practice.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It was suggested at an early stage in this article that as the study was  based  in  only  one  hospital
within  the  UK  care  must  be  taken   in   generalising   the   findings.    However,   the   research
encompassed a range of specialisms at  a  prestigious  hospital  whose  practices  probably  accord
with  national  standards  and  to  that  extent  may  be  a  fair  reflection  of  views  on  consent  in
secondary care.  Moreover what the study lacks in representativeness, it makes up for in  terms  of
depth. It provides insights into the way in  which  a  group  of  medical  practitioners  perceive  the
concept of informed consent  and  highlights  what  they  say  about  the  difficulties  they  face  in
practice. The study demonstrates that a misperception of the law may be a  cause  of  confusion  in
relation to disclosure trends and ambivalence as to what extent clinical discretion is  acceptable  in
practice.  The law itself remains imprecise and does little to allay these fears.  Arguably,  it  places
too much emphasis on risk disclosure and documentation, which are  only  two  facets  of  a  much
bigger picture.  The participants in the study emphasise that consent should be viewed  holistically
and centre on patients as  individuals,  something  which  looks  beyond  the  mere  legal  horizon.
These opinions are of particular interest, especially when compared to  the  findings  of  an  earlier
paper written by the present authors, the focus of which was on patient perceptions of the  consent
process.[98]  The indication was  that  the  patients  under  investigation  perhaps  viewed  consent
differently  than  the  medical  practitioners  here  insofar  as  they  believed  it   was   a   necessary
requirement of treatment which is  performed  to  protect  the  doctor  rather  than  themselves.[99]
Additionally, even though patients welcome the provision of information, it may  well  be  that  in
the majority of cases this information is not used in the actual making of  any  treatment  decision.
In  both  studies  clinicians  and  patients  do  share  parallel   views   about   the   desirability   and
importance of information,  communication  and  understanding.   Yet,  despite  these  similarities,
there was  very  little  recognition  from  patients  that  the  consent  process  itself  is  designed  to
safeguard their right of autonomous choice.  With this in  mind,  a  further  problem  with  consent
may be the different expectations of both parties within the process, a matter which perhaps  ought
to be the subject of further empirical investigation in the future.
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